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Perspectives for NATO-Russia Relations 
Forms of Confrontation Dominate – But Dialogue not Excluded 
Margarete Klein and Claudia Major 
Institutional relations between NATO and Russia have been suspended since the illegal 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine. Conflicting ideas about 
Euro-Atlantic security have left the relationship deeply and lastingly damaged. This 
makes it all the more important to gain clarity about the determining factors and per-
spectives of the relationship. Its evolution over the coming five to ten years will also be 
shaped by future events, such as the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 and elections in 
the United States in 2016 and Russia in 2016 and 2018. External developments will play 
a significant role, too. 
 
The relationship between Russia and NATO 
is undergoing its deepest crisis since the 
end of the Cold War. The target set in 2010 
of establishing a “strategic partnership” 
based on mutual trust, realisation of shared 
interests and respect for agreed principles 
such as the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe (1990) has been abandoned for the 
foreseeable future. 
This deep disruption is reflected in the 
suspension of dialogue and cooperation 
structures: In April 2014, in response to 
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and 
the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, NATO 
stopped civilian and military cooperation 
in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Previously 
this had extended from confidence-building 
measures, such as a dialogue on defence doc-
trines, to practical cooperation, for example 
training counter-narcotics personnel in 
Afghanistan. 
Despite its fundamental criticisms, NATO 
is upholding the possibility of political dia-
logue with Moscow. In April 2014 it decided 
to keep channels open at ambassadorial 
level. In fact, however, the lines have gone 
dead here too, with the NRC convening just 
once since that date. Even more serious 
than the cessation of practical cooperation 
is the massive loss of trust and the revival of 
traditional threat perceptions, above all in 
certain central and eastern European coun-
tries and in parts of the Russian leadership. 
Moscow is no longer a partner for NATO. 
The Alliance has responded to Russia’s 
actions with its deepest military adaptation 
since the end of the Cold War, with the goal 
of considerably strengthening and adapting 
its defence capabilities. Collective defence 
is once again a core concern. The Readiness 
Action Plan (RAP), adopted at the Wales 
Summit 2014 to steer NATO’s adaptation, 
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outlines immediate assurance and long-
term adaptation measures. By, for example, 
stepping up exercises and intensifying air-
space surveillance, the Alliance reassures 
concerned members that they can rely on 
NATO’s promise of collective defence. Adap-
tation involves the Alliance enhancing its 
readiness and responsiveness, for example 
through a new rapid reaction force (VJTF) 
and the establishment of NATO Force In-
tegration Units in eastern Europe. NATO 
regards these as defensive measures in 
accord with the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act (1997), in which both sides agreed 
principles for promoting confidence and 
cooperation. 
Moscow, on the other hand, regards such 
moves as evidence of NATO’s aggressive, 
expansionist character. In 2014 and 2015 
it again expanded military capacities in its 
Western Military District, which adjoins 
the NATO members Norway, Poland and the 
Baltic states: exercises were intensified and 
weapons systems modernised; Russia is also 
planning to strengthen its ground forces 
there and deploy more modern anti-aircraft 
systems. Following the annexation of Cri-
mea, moreover, restrictions on modernis-
ing the Russian Black Sea fleet fell away. 
Moscow also uses demonstrations of mili-
tary might as sabre-rattling: the number 
of Russian aircraft flying close to NATO air-
space increased significantly during the 
past year, and the Kremlin’s nuclear threats 
also give cause for concern. The latter were 
underlined in December 2014 and March 
2015, when nuclear-capable Iskander short-
range missiles were deployed to Kalinin-
grad for exercises. 
What this amounts to is the return of 
the security dilemma – which had appeared 
overcome – where actions that one side 
regards as defensive are interpreted by the 
other as offensive, therefore leading to esca-
lation. The consequence is a dangerous 
spiral of action and reaction. 
Three Scenarios 
Given that the goal to build a strategic 
partnership between NATO and Russia 
appear to have failed for the moment, the 
leeway for developing the relationship is 
limited. The following scenarios are con-
ceivable: 
1. Confrontation with strong potential 
for escalation. Lack of trust, inadequate dia-
logue and military build-up generate great 
instability. Tensions can escalate militarily, 
either accidentally as the result of misinter-
pretations or deliberately whipped up, 
for example for domestic political reasons. 
There are two particular dangers: firstly, 
that both sides possess nuclear weapons. 
Secondly, Moscow’s hybrid warfare offers 
many possibilities for misinterpretation in 
its broad grey zone between war and peace, 
military and non-military means, regular 
and irregular actors. The use of force can 
neither be clearly attributed to one party 
nor does it possess a distinct military 
character. 
2. Contained confrontation. Here too, 
there is neither aspiration nor hope to 
resolve the overarching conflict about the 
institutions and principles of the euro-
Atlantic security order. But both sides work 
to avoid a military escalation, for example 
with the assistance of transparency, con-
fidence-building measures and bilateral 
arrangements. Where shared interests exist, 
ad hoc cooperation is possible. 
3. Pragmatic partnership. The conflict 
persists but the actors are willing to address 
it in selected fields. This comes with an 
intensified, long-term and institutionalised 
cooperation – characterised, however, by 
rivalry. The likelihood of military escalation 
is smaller and the reliability greater. Yet, 
unlike in a strategic partnership, there is 
no shared bedrock of values and no vision 
for the relationship. 
Which scenario will prevail in the longer 
term will depend on internal developments 
in Russia and NATO, as well as on external 
factors. 
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Russia’s orientation. The domestic political 
situation is currently promoting a confron-
tative stance on the part of Russia’s leader-
ship. Since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s 
third term as president in 2012, Russia has 
increasingly distanced itself from the West, 
above all for domestic political reasons. 
When the previous basis of its legitimacy – 
economic success and the ability to gen-
erate prosperity – began to crumble (even 
before the Ukraine crisis) the Kremlin in-
stead mobilised a conglomerate of ideologies 
combining nationalism, harking back to past 
greatness and normative distancing from 
the “decadent” West. In foreign policy this 
is reflected in stiffening hegemonic aspira-
tions in the post-Soviet space and a turn to 
China. 
For the moment Putin can still rely on 
strong public support and effective instru-
ments of propaganda and repression. But 
the slow pace of economic reforms, the re-
percussions of Western sanctions and the 
low oil price have the potential to under-
mine the regime’s stability. This could tempt 
Moscow to step up its anti-Western rhetoric 
and provocative demonstrations of military 
power, such as major manoeuvres on the 
Western border or stoking the Ukraine con-
flict – possibly in the run-up to the Septem-
ber 2016 Duma elections, just a few weeks 
before the NATO summit, or before the presi-
dential elections scheduled for spring 2018. 
With the incentives including economic 
necessity and the costs of a junior partner-
ship with China, a rapprochement with the 
West is not out of the question. But for that 
to happen, the influence of the hardliners 
would have to shrink and the political 
weight of moderate realists and liberals 
increase. 
 
Developments in NATO. The 2016 NATO 
Summit in Warsaw could temporarily 
aggravate the confrontation. The Summit 
is due to announce the completion of the 
strategic realignment initiated in Wales. 
There may also be discussion of further 
adaptation steps, as demanded in particular 
by the host Poland. And the agenda could 
also include items that Moscow traditionally 
criticises, such as enlargement (with the 
expected invitation to Montenegro) or ad-
vances in missile defence. 
The decisive factor will be whether NATO 
can maintain its united front despite the 
existence of different positions. Although 
all the allies vehemently criticise Moscow’s 
actions, certain central and eastern Euro-
pean countries feel directly threatened, 
whereas others do not regard Russia as their 
main security problem. France is more con-
cerned about instability on NATO’s south-
ern flank. Opinions consequently diverge 
about how far NATO’s military adaptation 
should go and how strongly it should be 
directed eastwards. Some allies, above all in 
eastern Europe, largely reject dialogue with 
Moscow, while others, such as Germany, 
wish to make use of the dialogue channels, 
for example by calling a meeting of the NRC. 
 
External developments. Developments out-
side of NATO and Russia could potentially 
positively influence the relationship. Any 
defusing of the conflict in Ukraine could 
pave the way for a thaw in relations between 
NATO and Russia. This could result from 
successful crisis diplomacy, or from politi-
cal change in Ukraine or Russia. External 
risks such as Islamic extremism can also cre-
ate temporary incentives for NATO-Russia 
cooperation. Should the security situation 
in Afghanistan and its central Asian neigh-
bours deteriorate, it is unlikely that NATO 
would wish to become substantially in-
volved again (if it was even in a position 
to after refocusing on collective defence). 
That could lead Russia to assume a growing 
active security role with NATO’s approval. 
On the other hand, a flare-up of ethno-
territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space, 
for example in Nagorno-Karabakh, could 
burden the relationship. The same applies 
to “colour revolutions”, which Moscow 
views as a form of Western warfare. 
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Outlook and Options 
The fundamental conflict between NATO 
and Russia currently appears irresolvable, 
the relationship in tatters. A longer phase 
of tension and relative instability must 
therefore be expected. In order to prevent 
military escalation and bolster stability 
in the Euro-Atlantic area, current efforts 
should be directed towards avoiding both 
escalation (scenario 1) and mere contain-
ment of the confrontation (scenario 2), and 
working instead towards a pragmatic part-
nership (scenario 3). That does not mean 
watering down the normative acquis of the 
Paris Charter. Sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and free choice of alliance are non-nego-
tiable for NATO states. In order to avoid the 
Kremlin interpreting offers of dialogue 
and practical cooperation as approval of 
its actions in Ukraine, any moves towards 
pragmatic partnership must wait until 
Russia has made substantial progress with 
implementing Minsk II. Within NATO, such 
a partnership can only be realised if collec-
tive defence is guaranteed through credible 
deterrence, defence and resilience. 
As soon as these conditions are fulfilled, 
three steps would be needed to embark on 
the road to pragmatic partnership: 
Communication and dialogue: The once 
so dense network of contacts is not going to 
be reactivated in the foreseeable future – 
but precisely in times of crisis, communica-
tion must be maintained in order to keep 
possibilities of deescalation open. In the 
short term informal channels should be 
utilised, such as the meetings between NATO 
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the 
Russian ambassador to NATO, Aleksandr 
Grushko or Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov. This could be backed up by track-
two initiatives to explore the room for nego-
tiations. Should there be substantial pro-
gress on Minsk II, it would be advisable to 
gradually resume the NRC dialogue formats. 
Confidence-building and rules: Even if 
the political blockade continues, practical 
technical steps can be agreed to (1) avoid 
unintentional military escalation and 
(2) revive classical arms control. The former 
would include making use of the military-
level crisis contact mechanism proposed 
by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier. An agreement between Moscow 
and NATO on rules of behaviour for the 
safety of air and maritime encounters would 
also be useful. In the second area, the goal 
must be to stem the erosion of existing 
arms control agreements. In the first place 
that means preserving the Vienna Docu-
ment, as the most important current OSCE 
package on conventional arms control. 
Practical cooperation: If the relationship 
improves, practical cooperation in the NRC 
can be resumed step by step. Contacts at 
military level could first be activated in po-
litically uncontested areas of immediate ben-
efit to both sides, such as maritime search 
and rescue. Here the Alliance could draw 
on the experiences of individual members 
such as Norway. 
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